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Articles 
Child citizenship and agency as shaped by legal 
obligations 
Angela Campbell, Marissa Carnevale, Suzanne Jackson, Franco 
Carnevale, Delphine Collin-Vézina and Mary Ellen Macdonald* 
This article maintains that the legal recognition of obligations for children facilitates their 
recognition as citizens and agents when such obligations are understood from contextual and 
relational perspectives. Drawing primarily upon sources from Canada and the United States, the 
article advances this claim through a study of three separate settings. Part I examines the ‘child 
as student’ and studies children’s obligations within schools. Part II considers the ‘street child’ 
and the obligations and challenges children encounter when they live away from their families 
and communities. Part III contemplates the ‘child as bargainer’ and focuses on obligations 
children assume when accessing, negotiating for, and acquiring services in their communities. 
Introduction – obligations as constitutive of children‟s citizenship and 
agency 
Children‟s „rights‟ and „best interests‟, although relatively recent concepts, have generated 
extensive academic attention and commentary. Jurists have considered whether, when and how 
children acquire, maintain and exercise civil and political, and even social, cultural and economic 
rights.
1
 A parallel strand of work has focused on the notion of children‟s „best interests‟, a phrase 
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that is now prevalent within western legal texts pertaining to children.
2
 
Efforts to centralise the rights and interests of children can only be considered laudable. These 
initiatives carve a distinct space for children to have their voices heard and views known in 
matters affecting them. The perception of the child has thus transitioned from passive object of 
social norms and legal rules to active subject of the law with at least some measure of agency. 
While progressive, discussions advancing children‟s rights and interests are also incomplete, as 
they pay little heed to the idea of children‟s obligations.3 Such a notion might initially seem 
incongruent to the very idea of childhood, characterised primarily by dependence, need, 
ignorance and immaturity. In the result, it is typically difficult to imagine children as bearing 
obligations to each other, to their family and community members, or to the State. Yet imagining 
the child through the singular lens of rights, without a concomitant contemplation of her 
obligations, overlooks the extent to which law‟s recognition of obligations for children facilitates 
their recognition as citizens and agents. 
This paper advances two chief claims. First, it posits that acknowledgement of the child as a 
bearer of both legal rights and obligations substantiates her citizenship and agency. In tracing the 
connection between these concepts, we draw on the work of feminist theorists who see rights and 
civic participatory obligations alike as constitutive of citizenship, specifically through analyses 
that revisit what counts as public or political activity and activism.
4
 This feminist scholarship 
also identifies agency as a connective thread in discussions on obligations and citizenship, noting 
that civic participation both enables and requires an expression of agency. We rely on these 
connections to demonstrate how a child‟s involvement in civic life, primarily through the holding 
and fulfilment of obligations, cultivates her agency and social engagement. Ruth Lister makes a 
similar point in her reflections on citizenship and agency: 
„To act as a citizen requires first a sense of agency, the belief that one can act; acting 
as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters a sense of agency. Thus, agency is 
not simply about the capacity to choose and act but it also about a conscious 
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capacity, which is important to the individual‟s self-identity.‟5 
We argue here that law‟s extension of obligations to children is essential to the development of 
their citizenship, agency, and the „self-identity‟ to which Lister refers here. 
This paper‟s second central claim is that recognition of obligations for children must, to nourish 
and affirm a child‟s citizenship and agency, occur through a contextual methodology.6 That is, a 
child‟s legal obligations must account for her embeddedness within her own particular social 
context and social relationships. Thus, while law might attribute obligations to a child, it must 
acknowledge the realities of childhood linked to limited experience, exposure, defences, ability, 
and knowledge. In crafting obligations for the child, law must also identify the relevance of her 
interdependent relationships, most notably with family and community members. Having said 
this, it may be conceptually insufficient merely to call attention to the child‟s relationships and 
situational context.
7
 This point holds particular purchase within feminist analyses seeking to 
deepen, through consideration of context and relationships, law‟s appreciation of how socially 
and economically vulnerable subjects hold and exercise rights and obligations. Thus, simply 
touting the benefits of a contextual method will be un-instructive without elaboration; it is likely 
necessary also to identify the aspects of context that merit contemplation and weight in a given 
legal inquiry. This will be essential to a contextual and relational evaluation of law‟s perception 
of children‟s obligations as constitutive of their citizenship and agency. It charges the authors of 
this essay with the responsibility of setting out the contextual dimensions relevant to the analysis 
that we develop here about children. While contextually valuable features will always be case- 
and fact-dependent, overall, we envisage the child‟s age, the history and structure of her family 
relationships, her material, moral and intellectual goals, her physical setting, her educational 
background and needs, her life experience, and the communities in which she sees herself as a 
member, as key elements within a contextual study of the child‟s obligations, citizenship and 
agency. 
In advancing these two principal claims, this paper builds on literature that has considered the 
meaning of citizenship for children specifically through an analysis of a child‟s relationships 
with other actors. Centred within a network of relationships, the child may at once be recognised 
as an agent and as having interdependent connections to others.
8
 While this „relational‟ image of 
the child provides a meaningful grounding for children‟s rights9 and citizenship,10 it provides an 
equally compelling foundation for imagining their obligations.
11
 Through this prism of 
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obligations „as relationship,‟12 possibilities for the child‟s agency are discernable.13 She is 
viewed as bearing the potential and responsibility to make choices that affect those around her, 
thereby illuminating her civic membership.
14
 At the same time, her obligations must be 
delineated by the recognised vulnerabilities and dependencies inherent in childhood.
15
 
This theoretical framework is used to study the role and relevance of children‟s obligations in 
different social settings, drawing primarily upon legal authorities from Canada and the United 
States. Although these sources are couched in the language of rights, their close examination 
foregrounds the relevance of children‟s obligations. In Part I, we examine the „child as student‟, 
relying on sources that discuss children‟s rights in schools. We reframe these analyses to inquire 
into the obligations that a child might have in educational spaces. Part II considers the „street 
child‟. A child navigating through street life offers an important counterpoint to the image of the 
child as dependent, sheltered and protected by her family. Our analysis considers how law‟s 
approach to the street child frustrates her ability to meet her most basic obligations related to 
survival and law abidance. Finally, in Part III, we study the „child as bargainer‟, drawing on 
sources that reveal children as capable of seeking out and benefiting from opportunities they 
need or want. The analysis in this part focuses on whether, how, and to whom children bear 
obligations in accessing, negotiating for and acquiring services in their communities. 
Throughout this analysis, we generally refer to the actors in question as „children‟ even though 
most of the case studies we present involve adolescents.
16
 This is not surprising given law‟s 
awareness of a teen‟s developing autonomy as she bridges childhood and adult life, which would 
result in a wider breadth of obligations.
17
 Thus, „[t]he arguments for the increased participation 
of children in decision-making affecting their lives are both practically and theoretically more 
compelling the older the child is‟.18 Our argument, however, is that law‟s extension of 
obligations to children generally, even before adolescence, may be viewed as commensurate with 
recognising a child‟s citizenship and agency provided that this occurs through a contextual 
approach that accounts for her particular circumstances, her evolving level of maturity and 
awareness, and her interdependent connections with other actors. Furthermore, given the power 
of discourse to affect law‟s imaginations of children, we resist the term „youth‟, particularly in 
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view of its deployment in the „marketing‟ of varied legal measures aimed at „responsibilising‟, 
„adulterising‟, and criminalising children.19 
Ultimately, this paper does not aim to efface or undercut the crucial work that has succeeded in 
enhancing rights for children. The opposite is true. That is, this work aspires to give further 
traction to discussions about children‟s rights and interests by demonstrating how accepting 
notions of obligations for children can enhance their agency and civic membership where such 
obligations are achievable. As an actor who bears both rights and obligations, the child 
conceptually begins to stand on equal footing with her adult counterparts as one who not only 
benefits from rights, but also stands to make a contribution and difference through the fulfilment 
of obligations to others. At the same time, we posit that appreciating the child‟s situation in 
context and within a network of critical social relationships is necessary to ensure that her 
obligations, and by extension her citizenship and agency, have value and meaning. 
I. The child as student 
Given that children are generally subject to compulsory school attendance,
20
 one of their most 
important roles is that of student. Lessons learned at school surpass the content of curriculum; 
school is where children begin to discern and make sense of social relationships, and where they 
forge a sense of self. In making her way through her school years, a child‟s beliefs, conduct and 
modes of expression may bump up against rules put in place by educators and administrators 
with a view to ensuring safety and order. Where law has assessed children‟s entanglement with 
such rules, discussions have been pitched primarily at the level of students‟ rights. However, 
these discussions also illuminate the obligations that attend children whose views and behaviours 
are perceived to conflict with the norms structuring educational settings. Three principal 
obligations held by the child as student are considered in turn, followed by some reflections on 
the notions of obligation and control in school settings.  
(a) The obligations appertaining to one‟s faith 
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Multani)
21
 offers an example of the way 
in which law requires children to navigate their different, sometimes competing, obligations to 
religious and school communities. The case centred on Gurbaj Singh, a 12-year-old orthodox 
Sikh boy living in Montreal, Quebec who, as part of his faith, wore the kirpan, a religious 
symbol that resembles a dagger. When Gurbaj dropped his kirpan while playing in his 
schoolyard, his school board
22
 became concerned and offered to allow Gurbaj to continue 
wearing the object provided that he conceal this in a wooden box sealed in a cloth sheath sewn 
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into his undergarments. Gurbaj and his parents agreed to these terms. The agreement was not, 
however, endorsed by the school‟s governing board. The latter held that wearing a kirpan at 
school violated the school‟s Code de vie, which prohibited carrying weapons. The governing 
board‟s view was supported by the school board‟s council of commissioners, which indicated 
that Gurbaj could substitute his kirpan for a metal kirpan pendant or a wooden kirpan. The boy 
and his parents initiated legal proceedings, arguing that the refusal to allow Gurbaj to wear his 
kirpan on his person at school violated their rights to religious freedom as protected by both the 
Quebec and Canadian Charters.
23
 
The case ultimately found its way before the Supreme Court of Canada, where it was held that an 
absolute ban on the kirpan was inconsistent with Gurbaj Singh‟s constitutional religious 
freedoms. The Court noted that the interference with the boy‟s rights was significant, as it 
effectively prevented him from attending public (that is, a state-funded and state-administered) 
school. While the prohibition against wearing the kirpan was recognised as connected to a 
pressing and substantial objective – namely, ensuring a reasonable level of school safety – other 
means for the school board‟s council to achieve this end were available that would not conflict so 
deeply with the child‟s religious freedoms. 
While the Court‟s analysis in Multani is rooted in a rights-based perspective, the decision also 
conveys an appreciation of the young person‟s obligations. The judgment indicates that while a 
child is seen as capable of having religious convictions and expressing them in educational 
spaces,
24
 he is also understood to have an obligation to express his religion in a safe manner in 
relation to other members of his school community.
25
 When Gurbaj accepted the school board‟s 
conditions for wearing his kirpan, he acknowledged his obligation to practice his religion in a 
way that did not compromise student safety. Multani thus suggests that the child is obligated to 
refrain from religious observances that would compromise school security. 
Multani also points to a second obligation, which is more closely linked to the child‟s 
relationship with her faith. Gurbaj Singh was permitted to wear his kirpan because this was 
consistent with his sincere religious beliefs, pursuant to which the kirpan was only a religious 
symbol and could not be used as a weapon.
26
 Multani thus requires children to understand and 
respect the significance of their religious symbols and practices. More significantly for this 
paper, Multani reflects an appreciation of the child‟s situation within his religious group. Gurbaj 
Singh‟s kirpan was emblematic of his belonging within his family and community contexts. 
Drawing on an appreciation of obligations and agency that seeks to privilege relationships, 
Gurbaj‟s decision to wear the kirpan may be understood as upholding an obligation to these 
larger social constituencies in a way that solidifies his connections to and membership within 
them. Viewing this obligation through this lens creates a conceptual platform for recognising it 
as contributing to the child‟s citizenship and agency. 
Ultimately, Multani proposes a nuanced message about children‟s obligations that harmonises 
with this essay‟s main claims. The judgment recognises Gurbaj Singh explicitly as having rights 
and freedoms, and more tacitly as bearing obligations. Such obligations are situated within a 
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layered social context that acknowledges this child‟s relationships with his family, school, and 
faith communities. Accounting for and holding a child to such obligations in context holds 
promise for enhancing a sense of citizenship in these diverse relational settings, primarily 
through recognition of the child‟s „conscious capacity‟ for decisions and actions, and for 
absorbing the consequences thereof.
27
 We argue that this, in turn, both facilitates and compels 
the development of the child‟s agency. 
(b) Obligations alongside the right to privacy 
Similar to the legal appreciation of religious expression in schools, a student‟s right to privacy is 
limited by school security concerns and the consequential expectations regarding conduct that 
befall all members of a school community. In R v M(MR)
28
 a 13-year-old student, „M‟, was 
searched by his vice-principal while attending a school dance after the vice-principal received 
tips from several students that M was selling drugs on school grounds. This search revealed that 
M was carrying marijuana and he was subsequently charged with possession of narcotics. At 
trial, the judge excluded from evidence drugs that had been found through the search, holding 
that the vice-principal had violated M‟s right to be free from „unreasonable search and seizure‟ 
guaranteed by section 8 of the Canadian Charter. This finding was overturned by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which held that school officials may search students without a warrant when 
reasonable grounds exist for believing that the student has contravened a school rule and that the 
search will yield evidence of such contravention. The Court held that the vice-principal‟s search 
in this case met these criteria and did not illegally compromise M‟s constitutional expectation of 
privacy. Evidence deriving from the search was thus admissible.
29
 
Schools‟ responsibility for providing a safe learning environment results in a quelled expectation 
of privacy for their students.
30
 The majority judgment in M(MR) thus stressed the importance for 
school officials of having the flexibility required to act quickly and effectively to respond to 
situations that may disrupt school operations or risk students‟ safety.31 As such, a search on 
school premises without a warrant or other authorisation is not prima facie illegal.
32
 
Like Multani, M(MR) is decided principally from the angle of students‟ rights. The judgment 
tells us that a child‟s privacy rights do not altogether vanish at school, but her expectations in this 
regard are reduced in this context. M(MR) simultaneously sheds light upon students‟ obligations 
in schools. As in Multani, the decision depicts the child as central to schools‟ ambition of 
maintaining a safe and ordered environment for educational and social interaction.
33
 Even though 
a school‟s curriculum and rules are set by adults, ensuring their efficacy requires that they be 
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understood and respected by the youngest members of school communities, the students. The 
latter are therefore obliged to conduct themselves in a way that avoids compromising secure 
learning environments. This emerges in M(MR) both from the analysis of the vice-principal‟s 
search of M, and through the reference to the students who informed their vice-principal about 
M‟s suspected drug possession, whose conduct ultimately furnished „reasonable grounds‟ for  the 
impugned search. While these students are not characterised as having fulfilled an explicit 
obligation, their behaviour is implied as contributing to a safe and disciplined school 
environment.  
The students in Multani and M(MR) hold obligations in their schools primarily on account of 
their membership within such settings. These obligations reflect the child‟s conscious ability to 
choose particular paths of action and the child‟s belonging within her school community. In this 
way, such obligations are emblematic and facilitative of the child‟s citizenship and agency in this 
context.  
(c) Obligations regarding self-expression 
Just as concerns regarding school security can be invoked to limit a student‟s religious freedom 
and privacy rights, such concerns might also curtail her right to free expression. Emmett v Kent 
School District
34
 recounts the case of 18-year-old Nick Emmett, a star student and athlete with 
no disciplinary history who, apparently inspired by a prior creative writing exercise, posted mock 
obituaries of fellow students on his own private website that mimicked his school‟s homepage.35 
Nick was subject to emergency expulsion for „intimidation, harassment, disruption to the 
educational process, and violation of Kent School District copyright.‟ This disciplinary measure 
was subsequently modified to a 5 day suspension. Nick challenged his suspension before the 
District Court, which ruled in his favour. Even though his website was outside the school‟s 
control or supervision, the Court found that school administrators retained an interest given that 
„[w]eb sites can be an early indication of a student's violent inclinations, and can spread those 
beliefs quickly to like-minded or susceptible people‟. In this case, however, the evidence 
indicated that Nick Emmett‟s speech did not intend to threaten anyone or actually threaten 
anyone, nor did it issue any threats or display „violent tendencies‟. It could not therefore be 
limited by school authorities.
36
 
Emmett reinforces the idea that a child is obliged to refrain from conduct, including expression, 
which threatens school security. Yet, what of student expression that is not threatening, but 
potentially distracting? The landmark Tinker
37
 decision of the US Supreme Court provides 
insight into the way that law envisions communications within schools that may be viewed as 
„troublesome‟, but non-violent. The case involved three students who wore black armbands to 
school in protest of the United States‟ involvement in the Vietnam War.38 Having become aware 
of this plan, the principals of the Des Moines schools implemented a new policy stipulating that 
any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove this, and if she refused, she would be 
suspended until she returned to school without an armband.  
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The three children involved in Tinker refused to remove their armbands or to return to school in 
compliance with this policy. Through their parents, they filed a complaint seeking to restrain 
school officials from enforcing the new armband policy and disciplining students pursuant to it. 
The US Supreme Court majority held that the students‟ protest was permissible, as they had 
passively expressed their opinions with the hope of influencing others and did not interfere with 
the work of the school or the right of the others to be free from disturbance.
39
 The majority 
affirmed, in its now-famous passage, that „[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,‟ and that the interference with the students‟ expression was not permissible as their 
behaviour did not „materially and substantively disrupt the learning process‟.40 
At the same time, the majority affirmed that the State and school retain a „comprehensive 
authority‟ to stake out, monitor and control conduct within schools. Children in school settings 
thus may express their opinions as long as this does not interrupt the learning process or impede 
the rights of others in school settings. Students are obliged to censor themselves beyond these 
boundaries, a point illustrated in Bethel School District v Fraser (Fraser).
41
 In this case, high 
school administrators disciplined Matthew Fraser for his speech nominating his friend for student 
council that was replete with sexual allusions. Although not violent, Matthew‟s speech was 
considered, much like the armband-wearing children in Tinker, to constitute „disruptive 
behavior‟. Matthew‟s argument against school authorities claiming a violation of his 
constitutional right to free speech ultimately failed before the US Supreme Court. The Fraser 
majority distinguished the case from Tinker, contrasting the political message central to the latter 
case with the gratuitous sexual innuendo in the former to conclude that free speech in schools did 
not extend to protect „an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor‟.42 
Tinker and Fraser allude to students‟ obligation of self-censure where expression would prove 
disruptive or harmful to others in a school setting. Beyond this, a second obligation emerges in 
these cases. Emmett, Tinker and Fraser require students to listen to, and learn from, one another. 
While one normally associates learning in school with curricula, these judgments underscore the 
relevance of student education outside of classroom walls, and of the critical role students have 
in creating space for ideological pluralism in informal school settings. In his opinion in Tinker, 
Justice Fortas states that students may express their opinions not only in class, but also „in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorised hours‟. Such „personal 
intercommunication among students‟ is vital, for Fortas J, to the educational experience. Yet it 
requires not only expression, but careful listening and tolerance, too. For students like those 
featured in Tinker to have the right to wear black armbands, other students around them must be 
viewed as having a concomitant obligation to try to understand and tolerate that expression, 
regardless of their own opinions on the relevant issues. Similarly, in Fraser, Chief Justice Berger 
speaks to schools as the institutions tasked with preparing young people for the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship. For the Chief Justice, this requires student tolerance for „divergent 
political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular,‟ while at the 
same time accounting for others‟ sensibilities. In the final analysis, then, while students have an 
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obligation to listen to a plurality of ideas and messages, the right of others to communicate such 
ideas and messages is not absolute and can be legitimately curbed when the expression is „lewd, 
indecent, or offensive‟. 
Conclusion 
The cases in this part show how courts have engaged with the task of delineating student conduct 
and expression that generate controversy. Although students, given their young age and 
impressionability, may be socially construed as vulnerable and requiring supervision, the 
analysis here demonstrates law‟s willingness to perceive them as rights-bearers. Yet when 
exercised in the school context, these rights have important limitations, particularly in relation to 
school security. The child is thus directed to avoid or cease conduct or speech that threatens or 
that is gratuitously offensive. 
A second obligation emerges from law‟s approaches to the child as student. School is understood 
as the place where children learn not only from educators through a structured curriculum, but 
also from one another, through social engagement and interaction. The child as student is thus 
obliged to respect and tolerate diverse religious and political views. 
While we do not seek to offer an ethical or normative assessment of the cases discussed in this 
Part, we see these authorities as relaying critical narratives for discerning law‟s assessment of the 
child as student. These cases indicate that the law, by requiring children to behave and 
communicate in their schools in an earnest, safe and respectful manner, sets itself up as a tool 
that seeks to support the child‟s acquisition of citizenship and its attendant rights and obligations. 
Courts‟ willingness to recognise the student as holding obligations is probably best not 
interpreted as burdensome or as unduly encumbering or truncating students‟ liberties. Instead, it 
conveys juridical recognition of the child‟s intellectual and social capacity to contribute 
meaningfully to her school community and of her potential as citizen. We argue that this 
interpretation of children‟s obligations is dignifying, rather than detrimental, for the child as 
student. 
Such obligations are also unavoidable in settings, like schools, where children and their interests 
are central and where their self-identity is forged. Ensuring that students grow intellectually, 
emotionally and socially in schools requires more than a collection of rules created and enforced 
by teachers and administrators; students themselves are likely to be the most important actors in 
this regard. Most school rules, like those at issue in each of the cases examined above, require 
some student buy-in to have normative clout. Student obligations crafted in relation to such rules 
can therefore be reflective of their potential status, influence, and membership in schools. 
Having said this, a competing argument might be advanced in relation to these cases on the child 
as student. The rules at issue in the cases discussed above were crafted and imposed on students 
without their input. In an effort to ensure a particular pattern of behaviour and discipline, these 
rules might be viewed as pertaining more plainly to notions of control, governance
43
 and the 
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„construction‟ of a set image of childhood,44 as opposed to infusing children with a sense of 
citizenship or agency through obligation. Moreover, the extension of rights to students might 
actually reinforce rather than challenge this normative model of childhood.
45
 Excluding children 
from school because they break the rules of that setting, and subsequently attributing 
responsibility for such exclusion to the children themselves, seems inequitable and coercive.
46
 
So, too, does a requirement that a child follows further new rules, such as Gurbaj Singh‟s 
obligation to keep his kirpan securely fastened to his person, in order to return to school. 
While these qualms are of vital relevance, they do not preclude a progressive analysis of a 
child‟s obligations in a school setting. Our point in this paper is not that obligations for children 
are necessarily meant to be instruments of liberation. Instead, our argument is that viewing the 
child as developing within a network of interdependent social relationships allows for a 
recognition of her rights and obligations vis-à-vis the actors with whom she engages. 
Specifically, it recognises the child‟s ability to identify others within her communities who may 
be affected, possibly adversely, by consciously chosen decisions and actions. In turn, this view 
lends itself to perceiving the child as citizen and agent with particular reference to her social 
context and relationships. 
The foregoing discussion contemplates children‟s obligations in their most obvious social setting 
beyond the boundaries of home. Yet, children frequently detour from the trodden path between 
home and school. In the following parts of this paper, we consider other milieus outside the 
immediate family sphere that children may navigate, beginning with children who have decided 
or been compelled to leave home and who must survive street life. 
II. The street child 
Street children shatter the conventional image of the child as innocent, helpless and dependent on 
adult caregivers. Nevertheless, law views these children, especially girls, as defenceless and in 
need of protection, particularly when their choices are considered harmful and reckless.
47
 This is 
likely because law also construes the street child as isolated, severed from the social networks 
vital to children in other contexts. This Part explores the nature of obligations perceived to be 
held by children who have left their homes and families, typically due to abuse or neglect in 
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those settings.
48
 The analysis contemplates two main obligations: to provide for one‟s own basic 
needs, and to respect civic rules. We proceed to consider how current legal frameworks render 
these two obligations mutually exclusive in many instances, precluding street children from 
fulfilling both simultaneously. 
(a) Leaving home and family life, and the consequential obligation to provide for one‟s self 
Courts typically construe a child‟s departure from home and family life as a voluntary choice to 
become independent. This rationalises judicial decisions that transfer parents‟ obligations to 
support and provide for children to the child herself. Legislation supports such an analysis. For 
example, the Ontario Family Law Act stipulates that parents‟ general duty to support their 
children does not extend to minors aged sixteen or more who have „withdrawn from parental 
control‟.49 Similar language exists in family law legislation in other Common Law provinces.50 
Dhillon v Dhillon (Dhillon)
51
 offers a vivid example of how these principles play out in families. 
Jessica Dhillon, daughter to Sikh parents, sought a judicial order for support from her parents 
after leaving home. She also sought a Canada Savings Bond in her name and a restraining order 
against her parents. Jessica argued she had no choice but to leave her home at aged 16 after her 
father physically assaulted her in front of her mother and grandmother who did not intervene. 
The parents stated that the father struck their daughter in order to discipline her for breaking 
household rules and lying about this behaviour.
52
 They denied having any ongoing obligations to 
Jessica, arguing that after making many unsuccessful attempts to reconcile with her, they had the 
right to withdraw financial and emotional support because she was no longer under their control. 
Salhany J found for the Dhillon parents. While he recognised the strict discipline and unlawful 
assault to which Jessica had been subject,
53
 he denied her claim for support, framing her 
departure from the family home as a voluntary choice rather than the sole viable alternative for a 
child faced with parental violence.
54
 Dhillon suggests that the law typically will not be quick to 
intervene to evaluate the strictness of parents‟ disciplinary measures. If a child finds these rules 
unbearably severe and thus opts to escape her parents‟ control, she loses the parental support to 
which she would otherwise be entitled and the obligation to provide the necessities of life will 
fall upon the child herself.
55
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 Although Jessica brought her application 2 years after leaving home and was thus legally an adult, the judge did 
not factor this into the analysis. This could be because the parental assault occurred while she was still a minor. 
Arguably, the reasoning in Dhillon rendered Jessica more vulnerable than independent. By ruling 
that she had lost her right to parental support, Jessica‟s dependence on a boyfriend with whom 
she had begun cohabiting would only increase. If this relationship were to prove unhappy or 
somehow oppressive, she would face serious challenges leaving it because of the Court‟s 
understanding of Jessica as bearing the obligation to provide materially for herself. The judgment 
is exemplary of law‟s efforts to render children who leave or are forced out of family life 
„responsible‟ and „obedient‟. As the ensuing discussion illuminates, such efforts will fail when 
they do not take account of the particular realities for children who must survive without 
consistent and predictable support networks. 
(b) Obligations in tension: survival and law abidance 
Many children who flee their homes ultimately find themselves working and living on the 
streets. Carrying an obligation to provide for themselves, these children must locate and deploy 
methods for their own protection and provision. Yet, the obligation to feed and find shelter for 
oneself often runs counter to a street child‟s concomitant civic obligation to abide by the law. 
This tension is rendered particularly acute because of status offences that target children as well 
as other offences that disproportionately affect street children.
56
 The point is aptly demonstrated 
in the cases of „squeegee kids‟ and child sex workers. 
With limited education and no permanent address, most street children are unable to find regular 
paid work.
57
 In the early 1990s street children began washing car windows for drivers at 
stoplights in exchange for money. This activity soon became known as „squeegeeing‟ and those 
who took it up acquired the title, „squeegee kids‟.58 As a result of political and social pressures to 
„clean up‟ urban centres, the Province of Ontario implemented the Safe Streets Act.59 This new 
statute outlawed squeegeeing through provisions prohibiting commercial activity and the 
solicitation of people in vehicles on roadways.   
R v Banks
60
 involved a constitutional challenge to the Safe Streets Act on the basis of claimed 
violations of Sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Canadian Charter.
61
 A unanimous Court of Appeal 
for Ontario upheld the statute on each of these grounds. Speaking for the Court, Justice Juriansz 
held that activities targeted by the legislation were not necessary to the economic survival of 
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those charged under its provisions, and that they had other options to earn an income, such as 
„beg[ging] or provid[ing] a service in exchange for alms‟, which were outside the statute‟s 
purview.
62
 Further, the Court suggested that the Safe Streets Act was aimed at protecting the 
safety of citizens, including individuals targeted by the statute, by limiting pedestrian circulation 
in traffic lanes. In this way, the analysis at once depicts street children as offensive, and possibly 
threatening, while also in need of State protection. This lines up with law‟s paradigmatic 
perception of children „simply as “trouble” or “in trouble”‟.63 
Rather than protection, legal approaches like the one embodied in the Safe Streets Act and in 
Banks ultimately position street children as having to choose between respecting law and 
meeting their obligation of self-sustenance. Bill O‟Grady‟s field research revealed street 
children‟s frustration with the statute‟s imposition of limitations on their livelihood without 
simultaneously providing feasible legal alternatives. As one participant in this study stated, „I 
think if they‟re going to cut us off from squeegeeing they should give us another alternative. 
Right now they haven‟t done that‟.64 Another participant noted: „… if it gets too bad and I have 
to resort to criminal activity then I will do it – believe I‟ll do it… if they put me in a position 
where I have no choice, and if I get more desperate than I am now and I have no choice… then 
I‟ll do what it takes to survive‟.65 These passages illuminate the natural inclination to prioritise 
self-support and survival over civic obligations and law-abidance. The point is underscored in 
Justin Douglas‟ recent analysis of ticketing practices adopted by police in various Canadian 
cities in an effort to curb child homelessness.
66
 The consistency with which children are fined for 
municipal by-law infractions
67
 highlights the tension between their obligation, on one hand, to 
find shelter and food and, on the other, to respect legal rules. It further reflects the priority that 
they will, by necessity, attribute to the former obligation. 
Although well-intentioned, recent initiatives designed to promote law-abidance among street 
children cannot mediate the conflict between their obligations to themselves and to the State. The 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Regional District of Central Okanagan have 
collaborated to design a positive ticketing program, Recognising Every Strategy Promoting 
Excellent Community Trust (R.E.S.P.E.C.T.),
68
 which seeks to promote good public behaviour 
among children and to improve their relations with the police.
69
 When a child is found not to be 
engaging in negative or destructive behaviour, she may receive a „positive ticket‟ for things such 
as free slushies, pizzas, and passes to the swimming pool or the movies.
70
 The difficulty, 
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however, is that such rewards are largely out of step with the context and ordinary needs of a 
homeless child, struggling to survive the streets. As such, the extent to which such programs will 
incentivise compliance with laws that penalise urban street children is questionable. 
Statutes that sanction street conduct deemed publically undesirable or unacceptable risk driving 
homeless children to social peripheries, where they are less visible and less secure. This risk is 
particularly acute for girls who engage in sex work on city streets.
71
 Apart from the general 
criminalisation of activities associated with prostitution under Canada‟s Criminal Code,72 
measures have been instituted in some Canadian provinces aimed at eliminating child 
prostitution. For example, in 1999, Alberta enacted the Protection of Children Involved in 
Prostitution Act (PCHIP), which purported to protect children by granting police and child 
welfare officials the authority to apprehend any child who was, or appeared to be, involved in 
sex work.
73
 The legislature‟s stated intention was to transition children out of sex work. 
However, according to Jennifer Koshan, this legislation effectively legalised the forced 
confinement of girls on an assumption that apprehending them, even against their will, would 
protect child sex workers from themselves and their reckless behaviour. PCHIP criminalised 
children for what was presumed to be poor choice in dress, affiliation, and use of their bodies. In 
doing so, the law punished children for being indigent and lacking opportunities to take up more 
politically palatable economic activities. By targeting children as the object of sanction, instead 
of protecting them from their pimps or working with them to secure alternate and meaningful 
modes of subsistence,
74
 this law failed to recognise the needs, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and 
entitlements of street children. 
Following a successful constitutional challenge to PCHIP in October 1999, Alberta replaced the 
statute with the Protection of Sexually Exploited Children Act.
75
 This new statute addresses the 
constitutional deficiencies of PCHIP but arguably remains just as problematic in its orientation 
toward child „protection‟.76 The Act allows for the apprehension of children presumed to be in 
the sex trade and for their confinement in safe houses.
77
 While there is no doubt about the 
dangers of sex work, such legal approaches based on criminalisation and apprehension risk 
driving child prostitutes to work in underground, hidden and thus more dangerous settings. The 
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point is bolstered by a recent judicial finding that criminalising sex work threatens rather than 
safeguards sex workers‟ personal security.78 In addition, like other laws targeting homeless 
children, such initiatives focused on sex work render it impossible for these children to straddle 
their obligations to provide for themselves and to remain on the right side of the law. 
(c) Conclusion 
The State is obliged to enact legal regimes that promote compliance with and respect for the 
law.
79
 Arguably, the State fails in this duty when it creates rules that foreclose legal modes of 
survival for street children. Legislation such as Ontario‟s Safe Streets Act and Alberta‟s 
Protection of Sexually Exploited Children Act ignore the fact that once a child leaves the 
authority of her parents, typically as a result of abuse or neglect at home, law compels her to 
shoulder the obligation of providing for herself. The child who navigates street life will have to 
be resourceful in meeting this obligation and will often do so by panhandling, squeegeeing or 
prostitution. Outlawing such activities places street children in the impossible position of having 
to choose between shelter and food, or abiding by law. Obviously there is nothing real about 
such a „choice‟ and, as shown here, most children will need to stand in breach of the law in order 
to meet their basic needs.
80
 
Law‟s complicated image of the street child as at once vulnerable and independent is not 
shocking or new. Children faced with difficult life circumstances in other contexts might be 
similarly expected to be held responsible for outcomes, even when the law recognises their 
ongoing dependence and frailties.
81
 The troubling point that undermines the analysis here is that 
obligations for street children are excised from context. Street children are obliged to fend for 
themselves while adhering to State-crafted rules that fail to account for their material needs and 
for the relational networks that may develop on the streets or that may subsist with family and 
community left behind. These obligations also overlook the street child‟s entitlement and ability 
to make valuable social contributions despite her ostensible isolation and desperation. In the 
result, the street child‟s obligations are typically unrealisable. Vacated of possibilities for civic 
membership, such obligations also deprive the child of opportunities for developing and 
conveying agency. 
In some ways, law‟s image of the child as student and the street child stand in parallel. Both 
portray the child as a potential threat to herself and others while also exposed and needing adult 
protection, supervision and correction.  Both narratives rely on allusions to security to rationalise 
limits on children‟s options and conduct. Beyond this, law‟s perceptions of the student and street 
child diverge. The student is connected to her social context; her obligations relate specifically to 
her school community and its members, recognising her as a member of this community. 
Conversely, the street child is viewed as altogether removed from her social context and from 
any mutually-beneficial social relationships. The sole relationship of value she is seen to have is 
with the State, whose job it is to step in and shield the child and those around her from the 
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child‟s misguided ways. The street child is subject to an incoherent legal framework that 
preempts possibilities for meeting the obligations it imposes on her. This can only have the effect 
of constraining or altogether debilitating a child‟s citizenship and agency. 
Having considered the way that obligations for children play out in the contexts of schools and 
streets, the discussion that follows explores how these analyses compare with those suggested by 
law‟s perception of children who seek to access commercial, health and social resources. 
III. The child as bargainer 
While ordinarily cast as needing protections or exemptions from legal rules,
82
 law also imagines 
children as having some capacity to negotiate for and acquire resources they desire or need. For 
instance, the law recognises different points at which children can enter commercial or 
employment contracts, or consent to medical care without parental notice or endorsement.
83
 As 
children‟s autonomy burgeons, the extent to which they acquire concomitant legal obligations is 
less clear. What obligations does a child have in accessing and using services that she views as 
necessary for her well-being? This Part explores this question drawing principally on three 
judicial decisions that illuminate the obligations a child might bear when she moves into the 
world normally occupied by adults to seek out particular resources. 
(a) Negotiating for and accessing commercial services and goods 
Bédard v Roussin Parfumerie (bedard)
84
 offers a rendition of the classic story of teenage self-
expression that borders on rebellion. The matter arose after the parents of 13-year-old Chantal 
Bertholet learned their daughter had her navel pierced. Bertholet‟s parents alleged that the 
merchant who performed the piercing had acted unprofessionally and irresponsibly by providing 
piercing services to their daughter without parental consent. They claimed $2,000 for damages to 
their daughter‟s physical integrity and a further $1,000 for inconvenience and damages ensuing 
from the alleged failure to respect their parental authority. 
Drawing on Article 157 of the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ), Villeneuve J noted that a child may 
enter into contracts alone for her „usual and ordinary needs‟, within the limits set by her „age and 
power of discernment‟. The judge referred also to Article 220, paragraph 1 CCQ, which indicates 
that a child manages alone the proceeds of her work and her allowances paid to meet her usual 
and ordinary needs. She thereby concluded that law recognises a child‟s ability to make 
independent decisions as she matures. Chantal Bertholet‟s contract for navel piercing services, 
albeit counter to her parents‟ wishes, was thus valid and binding. 
On a quick read, Bédard seems a straightforward case establishing only that a child, even one as 
young as 13 years and 7 months, can pierce her body without her parents‟ involvement as long as 
the piercing does not cause physical harm. A closer look reveals how the judgment gestures at 
law‟s vision of children as bearers of obligations. Justice Villeneuve‟s reasons indicate that 
                                                          
82
 A clear example is found in the restricted and particular application of criminal law principles to young persons. 
See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 13, which precludes application of this statute to minors under age 12, and 
Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1, which sets out a framework for sentencing young offenders. 
83
 See Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, Art 14, 16, 17, 156 and 220. 
84
 2006 QCCQ 1074 (CanLII). 
Chantal Bertholet, like other children in her circumstances, held three particular obligations. 
First, her reference to Articles 157 and 220 CCQ reflects children‟s capacity to hold contractual 
and commercial obligations. As noted, these provisions recognise children as having the right to 
contract for their usual and ordinary needs in accordance with their age and power of 
discernment. Correlatively, then, children are also obliged to uphold their end of a bargain for a 
good or service that fulfilled such „usual and ordinary needs‟. Bédard therefore indicates that 
Chantal‟s obligations deriving from the contract (most obviously, to pay for the provided 
services) were legally enforceable despite her young age. 
A second, less explicit, obligation figuring in this judgment pertains to the parent-child 
relationship. Justice Villeneuve emphasises that Chantal Bertholet‟s decision to pierce her navel 
was entirely her own. Although this did not give rise to a legal remedy, it countered her parents‟ 
explicit beliefs and wishes. Similar to the approach taken in Fraser,
85
 where the court suggests 
that a student who breaks school rules must accept disciplinary consequences, Villeneuve J 
indicates that this child must assume responsibility for any adverse effects of her conduct on her 
relationship with her parents.
86
 The judge does not, however, comment on the propriety of the 
parents‟ rules. Although clearly dealing with a less severe set of facts, Villeneuve J‟s approach 
calls to mind Salhany J‟s abstention, in Dhillon,87 from commenting on the parents‟ physical 
disciplinary tactics. 
Finally, Bédard speaks to children‟s obligations related to their own health and physical 
integrity. The judgment characterises a navel piercing as a fashion statement that does not cause 
physical harm. It was therefore something for which a 13-year-old could contract independently. 
This reasoning suggests that a child has an obligation not to engage in conduct that puts her 
health or physical integrity at risk without parental involvement. This inference is consistent with 
the principle articulated at Article 17 CCQ, which calls for parental consent to medical 
interventions not required by a child‟s state of health if these entail a serious risk for the child 
and may cause grave and permanent effects. Parents‟ stake in a child‟s health care decisions is 
discussed further in the ensuing subsection. 
(b) Negotiating for and accessing health services 
As they reach adolescence, children are recognised as having a level of autonomy that may carry 
the ability to make independent health-related choices.
88
 Children are thus competent to consent 
to necessary medical interventions without parental permission or involvement at a certain point. 
This benchmark might be set by age,
89
 or it may be determined by an assessment as to whether 
the child is a „mature minor‟ who is able to understand her decision and its consequences.90 
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While adolescents may consent to some health care services, the law often treats a refusal to 
accept such services differently. Where the care in question is deemed necessary for the child‟s 
survival or to avert a serious health threat, a court may become seized of the matter and may in 
some cases have jurisdiction to order the administration of treatment over any objections.
91
  The 
precise scope of judicial discretion to intervene in a child‟s medical decisions is set by the 
applicable statute in a given jurisdiction. Where legislation grants a child the right to make 
independent treatment decisions, it is arguable that even a decision that appears to counter her 
best interests – such as a refusal of necessary care – should be respected.92 
A child‟s independence may also be curtailed where she seeks to consent to care that is viewed 
as elective and that may have serious consequences. Article 17 CCQ, referred to above, indicates 
that where a child aged 14 or older consents to care not required by her state of health, her 
parents‟ consent is also required „if the care entails a serious risk‟ and may yield „grave and 
permanent effects‟. Abortion may constitute a medical intervention within the ambit of Article 
17 CCQ. Canada has no explicit rules governing abortion for minors; general principles 
governing access to medical care will apply in such contexts. The American Supreme Court, 
however, has examined the governance of abortion on several occasions. This Court has been 
called upon to rule on the constitutionality of parental consent and parental notification 
requirements imposed by the State on girls who seek abortion services.
93
 
In Hodgson et al v Minnesota,
94
 a group of petitioners that included six pregnant children 
representing a class of pregnant minors challenged a Minnesota statute prohibiting the 
performance of abortions on girls under 18 until at least 48 hours after the notification of both 
parents. Certain exceptions, including a „judicial bypass‟ (that is, a court exemption from the 
parental notice and waiting requirements) were built into the legislation. A majority of the Court 
struck down the legislation as unconstitutional, holding that the requirement of notifying both 
parents was unreasonably connected to State interests in protecting children. 
Although multiple opinions are delivered by members of the Court in Hodgson, each is 
punctuated by emphases on children‟s interests, vulnerability, and need for guidance and 
counsel. Children‟s rights are also central, as the case recognises a child‟s constitutional right to 
terminate a pregnancy, even though the State may restrict its exercise. Quite apart from this 
focus on rights, interests and vulnerabilities, judicial discussions in Hodgson yield insight into 
law‟s perception of children‟s obligations. The Court intimates that children are prima facie 
expected to discuss matters pertaining to their health with their parents, even when this would 
reveal private or intimate information about the child. The State is viewed as having an 
acceptable interest in ensuring that a child, „when confronted with serious decisions such as 
whether or not to abort a pregnancy, has the assistance of her parents in making the choice‟.95 
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While this does not mean that a child‟s will succumbs to her parents‟ wishes in medical decision-
making,
96
 the Court signals its sense of the desirability of family dialogue about serious health 
choices.
97
 
Additionally, Hodgson tells us that children have an obligation to accept judicial involvement 
and approval where their medical choices risk seriously compromising their well-being. So while 
mature minors might be competent to consent to necessary care independently, judicial 
intervention may be engaged when a decision to seek or refuse an intervention may place a 
child‟s life or health in jeopardy or may have long-standing consequences. In Hodgson, this 
principle materialises in the form of the judicial bypass requirement for children who do not 
notify parents about decisions to seek abortion services. The principle also emerges in cases 
where a child and her parents refuse necessary medical care.
98
 This connection between children 
and the judiciary - and more broadly, the State - is even more pronounced in the discussion that 
follows regarding children subject to protective social services. 
(c) Negotiating for and Accessing Social Services 
Bédard and Hodgson suggest that the law expects children to consult with their parents about 
major decisions affecting them, and that children must respect their parents‟ right and obligation 
to play the lead role in guiding, supporting and teaching them as they mature. But these cases 
also tell us that this expectation is not boundless. Children are entitled to make autonomous 
choices that respond to their ordinary and everyday needs and lifestyles. This might have private 
repercussions at home, but typically law does not interfere with such familial fallout. Moreover, 
parental rights and authority can be limited by the State when these are deployed in a way that 
exposes a child to intolerable physical or psychological risk.  
A third narrative on the child as „bargainer‟ further clarifies the contours of the parent-child 
relationship in law while also casting the child as a bearer of obligations. This narrative affirms 
the non-absolute nature of parental rights and choices for children, demonstrating the power law 
gives the State to remove a child viewed as requiring protection from her parents‟ custody and 
control. The case in question, Protection de la jeunesse-456,
99
 involved a 15-year-old girl, 
referred to as „B.T.‟ The judgment casts B as resourceful and persevering in the face of 
extremely difficult family circumstances. B‟s parents required her to work without pay in their 
family business, which interfered with B‟s social and academic life. On occasion it resulted in 
her absence from school. She was physically disciplined by her parents, and had informed school 
authorities about this abuse. When this complaint failed to yield results, B presented herself at 
the Office of Youth Protection requesting her own placement in foster care. 
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Justice Bernier granted the Director of Youth Protection‟s application to declare B‟s security and 
development at risk, finding that allowing B to return to her parents‟ home would expose her to 
moral or physical danger. The judge rejected B‟s parents‟ argument, resonant with that advanced 
by the parents in Dhillon, to the effect that B suffered from behavioural problems and required 
disciplining. And although B told the Court she was eager to return home with her family, the 
Court, relying on expert evidence, held that B should remain in foster care until she re-
established communication with her parents and until her parents reflected on and re-evaluated 
their „attitudes éducatives‟. 
Consistent with Bédard and Hodgson and with decisions examined in relation to law‟s approach 
to the child as student, Protection de la jeunesse-456 is framed in terms of B‟s rights and 
interests. Bernier J focuses on the importance of adolescent socialisation and education, and on 
the need to protect B from being forced to assume a workload disproportionate to her capacities 
or level of responsibility. But the judgment also intimates a couple of ideas about children‟s 
obligations. First, Bernier J stresses that children should have opportunities for social integration, 
most obviously by attending school. Although she never states overtly that B had an obligation 
to be educated and to socialise, the judge viewed the parental prohibition on bringing friends 
home and on conduct like wearing makeup or jewellery as problematic. These elements, as well 
as B‟s absence from school and her limited ability to study because of parental demands, formed 
the basis of Bernier J‟s finding that B was in need of protection. The ruling is consistent with 
jurisprudence indicating that parental isolation of a child can interfere with the child‟s right and 
obligation to attend school.
100
 
A second obligation intimated by Protection de la jeunesse-456 pertains to the child‟s 
relationship with the State. Although B expressed the desire to return home to her family, the 
Court orders her continued residence in a foster home. Like her parents, B is equally subject to 
the judgment granting the Director of Youth Protection‟s application for intervention. B must 
comply with the terms of the order requiring her to remain outside of her parents‟ care until 
further judicial assessment. The judgment thus indicates that even when a child herself seeks out 
social services, if the State finds these services necessary for her protection she must accept them 
even if she subsequently revisits her choice and decides that she no longer wants or needs them. 
Conclusion 
Law perceives the child who crosses the confines of family and home life to seek out 
commercial, health or social services, as bearing autonomy to negotiate for and access resources 
she desires or sees as essential to her well-being. Yet, as the cases here show, that autonomy has 
limits. For example, while a child can make contractual undertakings, this entitlement is limited 
by the child‟s age and maturity level. The same is true for health services; depending on the 
gravity of the child‟s medical condition and the nature of the care sought, parents, social 
workers, and even the judiciary may be brought into the fold of analysis and decision-making. In 
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the context of social services, a child can ask for protection, but it is the State, through its Youth 
Protection or Child Welfare branch, that will oversee the matter and determine the proceedings 
and measures needed to safeguard the child‟s security. 
More subtly, legal sources also tell us that the child as bargainer is a bearer of obligations. She is 
viewed as having the obligation to respect certain contractual undertakings, and to accept State-
imposed requirements related to education, health and social services.  The child in this setting is 
also positioned more explicitly in relation to her family than the child as a student or the street 
child. While the student‟s obligations are primarily to her peers and school community, the street 
child, apparently severed from her family, has obligations focused on her own survival and law 
abidance. The child as bargainer, in contrast, has close links to her parents. While she may 
transact beyond the domestic sphere, she can venture only so far alone. Law still sees this child 
as nestled within a network of family ties, requiring her to consider her relationship with her 
parents in making significant decisions, even if this results in reduced privacy for the young 
person or risks engendering family conflict. Ultimately, the child as bargainer possesses a range 
of obligations that extend to those with whom she engages for services, to those having parental 
authority, and more broadly, to the State.  
This view harmonises with the perception of children as embedded in a network of 
interdependent social relationships, the recognition of which facilitates and enriches her 
citizenship and agency. Specifically, the citizenship and agency of the child as bargainer are 
manifest through law‟s recognition of her conscious ability to seek out services for herself, even 
when these services are controversial in the eyes of her family, her community or the State. Yet 
her abilities in this connection are bound by a set of obligations that reflect her status as a child, 
with evolving capacities and autonomy, as well as her reciprocal commitments with family and 
state. We see such obligations as constituting, at least in part, the citizenship and agency of the 
child as bargainer. In assuming obligations while taking up commercial, health, and social 
services, the child is viewed as acting in connection with larger constituencies, members of 
whom may be affected by, or called upon to support her in her choices and actions. The child as 
bargainer does not, therefore, act in isolation but as a member, or citizen, of broader social 
contexts, namely her family, communities and the State. Confronting, accepting and meeting 
these obligations serves as evidence and expression of the child‟s agency. 
Conclusion 
Legal sources contribute significantly to revealing the ways in which children can be meaningful 
members of their families and communities. Children are viewed as having rights, which may be 
tailored to, and limited by, competing interests relating, for example, to security or protection. 
Legal authorities also corroborate the thesis that a child‟s citizenship is rounded out by the 
inclusion of obligations, their nature and scope dependent on context. While the child as student 
is obliged to avoid compromising school safety and to exhibit tolerance for diverse opinions, the 
street child must provide for herself while respecting laws targeting indigent children. 
Meanwhile, the child as bargainer must adhere to appropriate commercial undertakings, involve 
parents in decisions with considerable health effects and respect juridical norms, even when 
these involve incursions into private family life. 
The narratives selected for consideration in this paper illuminate the value of appreciating how a 
child‟s civic and social identity is forged through the recognition of obligations. The child who 
engages with others in schools, on the streets, and in accessing services and resources is 
recognised as bearing the potential for conscious reflection. She is expected to grasp, in at least 
some measure, the possible ramifications of her conduct, words and choices. In consequence, 
law expects the child – whether as student, street child or bargainer for goods and services – to 
accept the consequences of her actions to the extent of her maturity and cognitive abilities. This 
is true regardless of whether such actions involve breach of a home or school rule, a decision to 
leave home, entering into a contractual agreement, or a decision to access child welfare services 
when faced with compromising family circumstances. 
At first blush, law‟s imposition of obligations on young people may seem austere. We instead 
see such obligations as critical to the child‟s citizenship and agency. Vested with obligations 
within various social contexts and relationships, children are given the message that they are 
empowered to achieve particular outcomes and to affect and engage with others. They are 
entrusted with the obligation to exercise their power, entitlements, and rights in ways that avoid 
inflicting risk upon those surrounding them. Given the link between notions of responsibility and 
citizenship,
101
 and because citizenship both requires and cultivates agency,
102
 the extension of 
obligations to children becomes foundational in promoting their social and political belonging as 
well as their own self-identity.  
There is, as this paper shows, an exception to the foregoing observation. Law‟s treatment of the 
street child cannot be said to infuse her with self-worth or agency. Her belonging in civic society 
is muted by a set of internally inconsistent rules that make it impossible for her to flourish, or 
perhaps even survive, if she prioritises law-abidance. The street child is thus typically an outlaw, 
stigmatised for engaging in prohibited conduct that is often necessary to self-preservation. This 
case study highlights how extending obligations to children can only facilitate their social and 
civic growth when such obligations are contextually designed. That is, these obligations must be 
realistic and realisable, ensure satisfaction of children‟s most essential needs, and recognise her 
ongoing dependence and the network of relationships she must continue to support and rely on to 
achieve autonomy and to develop and express agency. 
Finally, this paper yields an important observation about the parameters of children‟s obligations. 
Law‟s extension of obligations to children reflects their ongoing connections with their families 
and communities. This is consistent with the paradigm of obligations deployed here, which is 
meaningful only through recognition of the network of relationships central to the child. 
Although the parent-child relationship is only implicit in the context of the child as student, and 
is essentially ignored in analyses of the street child, a close examination of these circumstances 
reveals the persistent importance of this connection. For example, a child‟s conduct and 
expression at school is often reflective of values and beliefs instilled at home or within a cultural 
setting. This point is observable in both Multani and Tinker, the students in each case having 
worn to school symbols that reflect their own ideologies and those of their parents and larger 
communities. The child who navigates street life independently is cast as distinctly removed 
from family life, usually by choice. But as the analysis in Part II demonstrates, this is a flawed 
interpretation for many street children. A more nuanced juridical appreciation of the multitude of 
familial factors prompting children to flee parental control is apposite. 
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In contrast to the child as student and the street child, a study of the child as bargainer presents 
parents much more prominently and explicitly. While the law allows children to negotiate for 
services, parents are always perceived to be not far in the background, ready to be called forth 
where the services in question engender controversy. At the same time, the law does not see 
deference to parental rules as paramount. Rather than rulers over their children, parents are cast 
more properly as „consultants‟ with whom children should confer but not necessarily obey. Child 
disobedience may have no legal consequence (as in Bédard
103
) or if it does, the job of righting 
family conflict may legally rest with parents (as in Protection de la jeunesse-456
104
). 
Ultimately, an analysis of law‟s imagination of children beyond the limits of home and family 
life elucidates the centrality of their obligations. It underscores the value such obligations can 
yield, positioning children as capable of conscious self-reflection, citizenship and agency. At the 
same time, it warns against unrealistic obligations that fail to account for the contexts and 
realities of children, particularly those who face the most severe social and economic risks. It 
further stresses the need to account for relationships in considering children‟s obligations. Taken 
together, these factors offer a framework for appreciating obligations for children as paralleled 
with their rights and interests and oriented toward a textured recognition of their civic 
membership and agency. 
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